Introduction
Recent reports in the popular and academic press attest to the slow pace of land reform in rural South Africa (Levin and Weiner 1997; Star Business Report 2001; McCusker 2002; Mail & Guardian 2004a 2004b with a growing consensus that the lack of clarity about land rights remains the central impediment to effective planning and implementation (Levin and Mkhabela 1997; Ntsebeza and Hendricks 1998; Ntsebeza 2000; Cousins 2001) . As Cousins (2001) suggests, potential investors are often unclear about whether they should negotiate with the central government, which owns the land; local government, which administers development projects; or traditional leaders who claim to represent communities. The consequence is that 'local residents are often excluded from decisions about the land they occupy and depend on for their survival' (Cousins 2001, 25) . Additionally, a number of cases within the Mpumalanga and Limpopo Provinces demonstrate that traditional elites have been able to exploit the ambiguities surrounding land ownership while utilizing new development opportunities to further expand their influence in rural areas (Forrest 2001; Land Reform 2001; Ramutsindela 2001; Yende 2001) .
The question of who has rights to land and other environmental resources within rural South Africa reveals a deep history that continues to be negotiated in the post-apartheid era. Colonial and apartheid governments utilized traditional systems, including the tribal authorities, as a means of controlling society and space. Although these systems are undergoing change, they continue to shape the livelihood opportunities available to rural households. As others have argued, the slow pace of redistributing land to previously disenfranchised communities necessitates analyses of the tribal authorities in the former apartheid homelands (Levin and Weiner 1997; Cousins 2001) . This paper uses a case study of the Mzinti community in the former KaNgwane homeland to evaluate the scope and impact of the Matsamo Tribal Authority in controlling environmental resources in the region. Particular attention is directed towards how the tribal authority continues to exert control over communal space for wood access, grazing space for livestock and new agricultural projects offered through the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development Programme (LRAD). Although the Matsamo Tribal Authority contributes in shaping access to environmental resources and development opportunities in the region, it is being challenged by the emergence of new structures and agencies. The result is that rural households increasingly engage with a variety of systems to generate livelihood opportunities, which disadvantages the poorest members of the community who are less able to influence traditional and contemporary decisionmaking structures.
In the first section of the paper, a historical overview of colonial and apartheid systems of segregation is provided to explore the role of traditional structures in shaping access to land and other environmental resources in rural South Africa. This is followed by an analysis of the case study, which draws upon fieldwork completed in South Africa from May 2000 to July 2000 and August 2001 to August 2002. An asset-based livelihood framework is employed to evaluate livelihood production patterns, dependency upon environmental resources, and community views on the scope and impact of the Matsamo Tribal Authority within the region. The paper concludes by considering the potential for land reform and development opportunities to reach the poorest members of the community in light of the continued presence of the tribal authorities within the former apartheid homelands.
The tribal authorities in colonial and apartheid South Africa
The segregation and exclusion of South Africa's peoples and landscapes precedes the apartheid era. In fact, the apartheid government's use of the tribal authorities was a continuation of the British system of indirect rule, which was based on the belief that Europeans and Africans were culturally distinct and that the institutions of government most suited to Africans were those they had traditionally constructed.
1 Colonial rule proceeded through governing through these local institutions, rather than completely replacing them with colonial inventions. Crowder argues that indirect rule did not necessitate the use of chieftaincies, however '. . . in practice indirect rule laid heavy emphasis on the role of the chief in the government of African peoples, even for those peoples who traditionally did not have political as distinct from religious leaders ' (1968, 169) . The use of these institutions required some modification of existing organizational structure, particularly aspects of traditional government that were deemed repugnant by European ideals, or aspects that restricted the effective exploitation of the country or people. To this end, the British deposed and marginalized rebellious chiefs, while rewarding those that did their bidding. In this way, the British were able to exploit traditional systems by fostering competition and uncertainty and sow the seeds of discontent for future generations.
Ntsebeza (2000) suggests that the use of traditional authorities by colonial powers enabled them to exploit an ambiguity in the relationship between chieftaincies and their people, particularly in terms of the accountability and legitimacy of traditional systems. Although cases exist where the community mediated the power of the chiefs (Tapscott 1997), tribal structures were often autocratic and based on dominion, rather than benevolent rule (Peires 1981; Lambert 1995) . The colonial appointment of traditional authorities marked a departure from existing African traditions, as the British freely appointed leaders without consulting councillors or elders, and sometimes chose leaders that were not in the direct line of lineage. Additionally, a series of rulings, including the Glen Grey Act of 1894 and the case of Hermansberg Mission Society v. Commissioner of Native Affairs and Darius Mogale of 1906, strengthened the power of traditional authorities at the local level. The Glen Grey Act was instrumental in shifting land ownership systems within the native areas from communal to individual tenure, while leaving the chief with control over unallocated land. Ntsebeza reports that, in the latter ruling, the court held that 'an African chief, as trustee of the community's land, may alienate land with the consent of the chief's council and without the direct participation of the community ' (2000, 285) . This reinforced the notion that the chief was the steward of tribal land, and that unallocated land could be accessed and utilized at the whim of the tribal authority.
The empowerment of the tribal authorities was linked to colonial understandings about the role of the chief in owning and managing the landscape. Although the colonial government provided clear restrictions upon tribal authority power, the right to control land allocation was vested in the chieftaincies. Levin and Mkhabela (1997) suggest that the notion of the chief as custodian or trustee of land was a colonial creation, produced by the need for creating a customary land tenure system. Traditional communal tenure and perceptions of 'communalism', therefore, were myths developed during early colonialism in southern Africa. Letsoalo (1987) argues that the chief traditionally controlled the land, but once it was allocated to individual households, his authority ended. Regardless, a 'misunderstanding of the "functions" of the chief and the cultural obligations of tribal people have led to the many allegations that the chief controlled the land of the tribesmen' (Letsoalo 1987, 21) . Similarly, Ntsebeza concludes:
. . . it is not accurate to refer to rural areas that are controlled by traditional authorities as 'communal' areas. What could be referred to as 'communal' land is, in fact, land that has not been allocated for residential and/or arable purposes, for example, grazing land, forests, and so on. It is this category of land that will be dominating debates about ownership rights in the countryside in post-apartheid South Africa. (2000, 287) The 1920 Native Affairs Act was the first major legislative effort to bring consistency to rural local government and attempts were made to organize the Zululand and Transvaal reserves along the Transkei model. The new government moved towards a policy of segregation, and as Beinart explains, the 'chieftaincy in a modified form came to be seen by segregationist ideologues as a means to defuse agrarian and industrial class conflict in the 1920s ' (1982, 6) . The passage of the Native Administration Act of 1927 was intended to 'shore up the remains of the chieftaincy in a country-wide policy of indirectrule, which would allow for the segregation of the administration of justice ' (Ntsebeza and Hendricks 1998, 5) .
The 1936 Natives Acts were the crowning achievement of pre-apartheid segregation, as they expanded the native reserve system and the role of the tribal authorities. One of the Acts, the 1936 Natives Land Act , was designed to purchase additional land, called 'released areas', for consolidation of the reserves. Rural people applying for land were granted a permission to occupy (PTO) to establish that the land had been allocated to them (Ntsebeza 2000) . As Ntsebeza suggests, the Act empowered the local magistrate to grant permission 'to any person domiciled in the district, who has been duly authorised thereto by the tribal authority, to occupy in a residential area for domestic purposes or in an arable area for agricultural purposes, a homestead allotment or an arable allotment, as the case may be ' (2000, 287) . Furthermore, the Act provided strict guidelines for Native control of land, and tenure rights would be forfeited if owners failed to take occupation of land fenced within one year of allocation or made decisions that resulted in nonbeneficial use for two years. PTO holders could be forcibly removed when the government deemed it necessary, sometimes without payment, and PTOs were not recognized by financial institutions because they were seen as limiting investment opportunities, more productive use of the land, and the prospect of getting housing subsidies (Ntsebeza 2000) . The PTO system effectively laid the groundwork for spatial patterns of control and exclusion by the state and tribal authorities and would be exploited by the apartheid government in the years to come.
The apartheid government extended the British system of indirect rule by utilizing traditional structures to rule. The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 recognized the tribal authorities as the chief governing system and abolished the Native Representative Council that was created by one of the 1936 Natives Acts . Bantu authorities were organized into tribal, regional and territorial levels, and at all levels, the tribal authorities were dominant. Africans in the urban areas were also expected to accede to the tribal authorities, and efforts were made to create urban representatives of tribal chiefs. The apartheid government's empowerment of traditional structures caused Mbeki to state:
It is clear from the composition of these bodies that they represent merely the messengers of government will; the elected element is so small and so remote from the voters that it can hardly be held even to contribute to popular participation. The thesis of government policy is clear -Africans are still in the tribal stage, chiefs are the natural rulers, and the people -neither want nor should have elected representatives. (1984, By applying the British strategy of indirect rule, the apartheid government created and empowered certain tribal leaders and often imbued them with greater authority than they historically possessed. Ntsebeza (2000) reports that the tribal authorities were affiliated with the central government through the Department of Native Affairs and the Minister of Native Affairs had the power to depose any chief, cancel the appointment of any councillor, appoint any officer he deemed necessary, control the treasury and spending, and authorize taxation. The power of the tribal authorities was expanded during apartheid because the chief was in control over land allocation, and with the establishment of the homeland system, these were the only locations where the majority of Africans could legitimately claim land and a home (Tapscott 1997). Chiefs and their family members were often rewarded by their engagement with the apartheid system, through either salaried positions or educational opportunities. Additionally, ambiguities in traditional and contemporary tenure institutions enabled them to exploit villagers by charging for services or other needs such as state pensions, tribal courts and migrant labour opportunities (Ntsebeza 2000) . Traditional authorities developed their power not from popular support, but from the fact that they were feared and that rural people did not have alternative ways of accessing their benefits (Ntsebeza 2000). As Levin and Mkhabela explain:
Taken in conjunction with their control over land and the access to 'reciprocal donations' which this gave them, this enhanced their capacity to accumulate land and livestock and placed them at the center of processes of social differentiation. The chieftancy thus became a mechanism of accumulation, inaugurating a process of accumulation-from-above which has shaped rural social structure and the character of anti-democratic practice. (1997, 160) By employing indirect rule, tribal authorities became the primary lever of rural local government and played a central role in land allocation throughout the apartheid period.
Traditional authorities in post-apartheid South Africa
There is near consensus in the South African literature that shortly before, and immediately following, the 1994 elections the African National Congress (ANC) remained ambivalent about the role of the tribal authorities in the rural areas (Levin and Mkhabela 1997; Ntsebeza 2000) . The corrupt practices of traditional authorities were rigorously questioned in the 1980s, and some resistance leaders attempted to draw a distinction between 'genuine' traditional authorities and 'illegitimate' ones. Levin and Mkhabela (1997) assert that, in the interests of alliance building, the ANC's hesitancy gave way to cautious support for 'progressive chiefs', as coalitions were formed with Intando Yesizwe of Kwandebele, Inyandza of KaNgwane, the UPP of Lebowa and with the bantustan regimes of Venda and Transkei. The perception that the ANC was a government in waiting in the late 1980s led a number of homeland leaders to visit the ANC at its headquarters in Lusaka. KaNgwane's chief minister, Enos Mabuza, was the first bantustan leader to visit the ANC and pioneered a path for other leaders to ally themselves with the ANC (Niekerk 1990) . Generally speaking, the ANC attempted to court the traditional authorities, rather than develop a strategy to establish alternative structures that would replace them following the democratic elections. Levin and Mkhabela (1997) argue that the ANC's ambiguity towards the tribal authorities allowed the institution to be formalized in the new Constitution. Additionally, there have been attempts within Mpumalanga Province to distinguish between 'political functions' and 'traditional functions', with the belief that as long as tribal authorities commit themselves to the latter, there would not be problems. The issue, of course, is that no development issue is apolitical and the conflicting roles of the chieftaincy and new municipalities raise significant challenges for future land allocation processes within the country. The fact that colonial institutions of tenure rights combined a contradictory set of communal and individual land rights is a point not forgotten by land rights scholars. As Ntsebeza states:
. . . recognizing unelected traditional authorities who, during the apartheid period in particular, were largely discredited and feared, while remaining vague about their precise role in land tenure and local government, means prospects of extending representative democracy to these areas, and implementing emerging policies and legislation become extremely doubtful. (2000, 281) The role of the tribal authorities within the homeland system remains important to understanding the meanings and impacts of the places of apartheid. The institutions of land ownership and allocation that were created during the colonial and apartheid periods influence land tenure reform in the post-apartheid era, as tribal authorities continue to exert control over land and other environmental resources necessary for livelihood production. Additionally, tribal authorities are participating in shaping patterns of resource access that have material impacts upon rural households. The specific activities of traditional authorities are extremely localized, however, as some chiefs have engaged with the new governance structures, while others are feeling their power eroding. At the present time, the expectation is that the traditional authorities and post-apartheid systems can co-exist, although the specific roles are not clearly articulated and are often conflicting and contradictory. Land reform activists and researchers have proven sceptical of this arrangement and assert that the tribal authorities are the chief impediment to the transfer of land to disenfranchised populations. In addition to the ambiguities and legitimacy of traditional authorities, the contradictions between traditional governance systems and the newly created democratic structures are contributing to misunderstandings as to the institutions of resource access in rural South Africa, patterns of livelihood production and governance systems in the former apartheid homelands.
Livelihood and governance systems in the former KaNgwane homeland
In order to evaluate the role of the tribal authorities in the post-apartheid period, this paper uses a case study of the Mzinti community, which is located in the former KaNgwane homeland. The community remains under the jurisdiction of the Matsamo Tribal Authority, which has its main office in Schoemansdal, although local representatives of the tribal authority live in Mzinti. In addition to evaluating the impacts of conservation and development projects within the region, research collected quantitative and qualitative data on livelihood systems, dependency upon environmental resources and the role of the Matsamo Tribal Authority in administering access to diverse resources. An assetbased livelihood framework was employed (Barnes 1996; Batterbury and Forsyth 1999; Bebbington 1999) to examine financial, physical, human and social assets for 478 randomly selected households within the community. In addition to diversified livelihood strategies, a class system is emerging as the power of traditional structures to influence decisionmaking gives way to post-apartheid structures (Bob 1997; Levin et al. 1997) . The creation and expansion of the Ehlanzeni District Municipality, for example, is generating economic and political opportunities for individuals to access previously unavailable resources. Although the pace is slow, as political structures are renegotiated, residents will engage with the expanded opportunities available to them and rework livelihoods and resource access in rural areas.
The Matsamo Tribal Authority continues to have its greatest influence in shaping how individual community members access environmental resources in the region. The emergence of new environmental legislation and agencies, however, has challenged the legitimacy of the tribal authority in managing certain resources to which it has historical claim. The household surveys provide insight into the dominant livelihood strategies and environmental resource dependency within the community. Mzinti residents continue to depend upon environmental resources for livelihood production with a majority reporting using environmental resources on a regular basis. Households primarily use wood for cooking and heating, land for farming and sand that is purchased and used for construction. Additionally, households access environmental resources for a variety of purposes, including the use of wood for construction, land for grazing of cattle and goats, thatch grass for construction, medicinal plants and fishing. The livelihood strategies employed by Mzinti residents serve as an entry point for evaluating the governance systems influencing development in the post-apartheid era. Since the collection of certain resources continues to be managed by the tribal authority, the sets of rules need to be examined to understand how they have changed over time.
Wood and farming land
The collection of wood for energy fuel is one of the most common uses of environmental resources within the community, and the use pattern parallels wood collection within other regions of South Africa (Eberhard 1990; Shackleton 1994 Shackleton 1998 and the developing world (Grundy et al. 1993; Sundriyal et al . 1994 ). Fifty-eight per cent of households report cooking with wood at least once a month, and 50 per cent use wood as their primary energy fuel. particular household member collecting wood varies, ranging from young children to the elderly and collection occurs at various points around Mzinti. Within the region, the induna (head man) and chief work together to grant permits for wood collection with the understanding that communal land belongs to the tribal authority. The tribal authority issues permits for wood that is collected for construction; however, wood for energy fuel is not restricted. As the former induna explained: 4 Those who want to cut trees and make houses, they must have a note. Once they come to me, I take them to the chief to get permission so that they can cut trees. But some people, they don't want to do that . . . Here at Mzinti it was not a problem to get wood but then came people with chainsaws from across the river, and they cut the trees . . . Now we are trying to stop people from cutting trees but they don't listen.
In addition to permits for resource collection, the tribal authority grants plots of land to new residents and decides which community members will benefit from agricultural projects, such as the LRAD sugar cane project. LRAD was initiated by the Department of Land Affairs and the Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment and is designed to establish irrigation development for 1828 hectares of farming land for the settlement of 241 small-scale commercial sugar farmers, 456 women's group members and 50 youth club members. As a promotional report attests, the Mzinti small-scale sugar cane project is one of seven projects in the region 'aimed at helping previously disadvantaged South Africans, especially women, join more than 50 000 already established small sugar cane growers and tap into one of the country's biggest foreign exchange earners' (African Connexion 2002, 28) . Within Mzinti, an area of roughly 245 hectares north of the community was converted to sugar cane farms in 2001. This area was divided into 35 plots of 7 hectares each, with a variety of grants and loans forming the basis of the LRAD plan.
Although LRAD is intended to distribute land to previously disenfranchised households, the participation of the tribal authority in determining ownership of the plots has important implications for the effectiveness of these projects in reaching the poorest community members. Of the 35 plots demarcated for the Mzinti community, the majority belongs to households within the older section of the community who have stronger ties to the Matsamo Tribal Authority. In a number of cases, individual farmers pooled together as collectives and were effective in lobbying the tribal authority for land. In others, the tribal authority used the project to recognize existing power structures within the community, rather than alleviate poverty by granting title to the poorest members of the community. The induna and members of his family have sugar cane plots, and all of the households reporting plots have male owners. Additionally, political elites benefited from the distribution of plots, which suggests that the tribal authorities continue to use development projects to control resources and reward allies within the region.
The lack of transparency about land allocation only reaffirms the sense of mistrust of the tribal authority felt by some households within the community. As one respondent explained:
I don't see any changes [in Mzinti]. I can tell you that I have a farm and they said we must register as farmers and we would be the first people to plant sugar cane. But at the end, they went and took people from another location and put them in our places and we did not get anything. We complained a lot and even took the induna to the chief to fight this problem, but we did not get anything.
Another Mzinti resident, who is originally from Mozambique, said he was turned away because he did not belong in Mzinti and the farms were not intended for him. LRAD's stated objective to distribute farming plots to disenfranchised rural households is admirable but the distribution process needs to be carefully scrutinized. One of the brochures for the project uses a female farmer as a role model for LRAD's success in distributing land; however, it does not address the fact that she received her 20 hectare farm 'as a reward for her loyal 18 years served as a clerk for the local chief' (African Connexion 2002, 30) . Within the community of Langeloop, a new chief submitted a different list and disrupted the selection process (Land Reform 2001). As has been reported elsewhere (Forrest 2001; Yende 2001) , land distribution remains an instrument for the tribal authority to reward elite members of the community and retain control over environmental resources in the post-apartheid period.
The influence of the Matsamo Tribal Authority is not absolute in the rural areas of South Africa, however, as the institutions shaping environmental resource access are being reworked with the creation of new resource management laws. With the passage of the Mpumalanga Nature Conservation Act in 1998, the Wildlife Protection Service (WPS) of the Mpumalanga Parks Board has been empowered to enforce new restrictions on wood collection, medicinal plant collection and fishing. This has increased tensions within the region and had subsequent effects upon community views of conservation and development planning. As one example, tribal authority permits for wood collection are being renegotiated with the Parks Board and challenging the legitimacy of the Matsamo Tribal Authority in managing resources to which it has historical claim. This is reflected in the comments of one wood seller, who argued that the conflicting rules make environmental resource access unclear:
[The Parks Board] say I am destroying the trees but the problem is that how is this so, since I am collecting dry wood? They say I am killing animals and they say they want paper for me, or a license. Since 1993, I had a license for cutting wood from the chief but the Parks Board claimed that the license was for cutting poles and not for cooking wood. I am surprised because the tribal authority did not tell me that so even now I have the letter at the Shongwe Tribal Authority, which cost me 10 Rand. What is surprising is that before they only took the load that I had and now they want money. Where will I get the money?
The Mpumalanga Nature Conservation Act has expanded the regulatory authority of governmental agencies and placed them at odds with the Matsamo Tribal Authority in managing resources in the region. In the clearest example of the conflict between apartheid and post-apartheid structures, the WPS sanctioned the chief in 2001 for issuing permits for wood collection that violated the Act. This direct encounter suggests that the rules of environmental resource use, and the systems governing them, are being reshaped in ways that will subsequently impact the ability of rural households to access resources and produce livelihoods in the postapartheid era.
Conclusion
Colonial and apartheid governments utilized tribal authorities as a mechanism for the indirect rule of South Africa's landscape and society. Tribal authorities were deemed the authentic governance system and were empowered with greater authority and privilege than they had historically possessed. Rather than develop alternative structures, the ANC remained ambivalent and allowed them to become part of the democratic operations of the new government. The use of the tribal authorities left lasting institutional frameworks that continue to impact how households access a variety of environmental resources and development opportunities. In the former KaNgwane homeland, the Matsamo Tribal Authority exerts control over communal land where residents access wood and other environmental resources for livelihood production. Additionally, the tribal authority is able to reward elite community members through the LRAD sugar cane project and other development initiatives. Tribal authority power is not absolute and the emergence of new environmental legislation and the municipal system has reduced its scope and influence by reworking the sets of rules governing resource access. Community members increasingly recognize governmental agencies as the primary vehicle for development, which has challenged the tribal authority's control over landscapes and people to which it has historical claim. Although it remains to be seen, this renegotiation between historically situated governance systems could provide new opportunities for rural households and truly redress the inequities of the apartheid era. 
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